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ON SPARSHOIT'S "VISION A N D  DREAM I N  THE CINEMA" 
by 
Jack Glickman 
George Linden notes that "there is a long history of regarding the motion picture 
as a form of dreaming (Hollis Alpert calls his book The Dream and the Drea mers. 
Hollywood is called a 'dream factory', and numerous theatres are named 
'dreamland')."1 And some writers on dreams assume them to be a likeness of the 
screen image - e.g. Masserman's comment that "no dream as such has ever been 
analyzed, or ever will be analyzed, until we develop a technique of reproducing the 
dream sequc;nce itself on a television screen while the patient is asleep"2; notice the 
easy assumption that ''the dream sequence itself" can be reproduced as a screen 
sequence, that the two are that alike. But the assumption seems natural; films, and 
1elevision. are like dreams: those evanescent and thinly real images arising in 
darkness have 1he power to create a world of elastic time and space that is 
thoroughly convincing, apparently authentic. 
But then again, films are not like dreams. In my dreams I can. sit with others at a 
table. drink coffee and converse. pet a lion that wanders by; but in no cinema can I 
converse with those in a filmed cafe scene, drink their coffee, pet their lion. I am 
present in and participale in my dreams in a way in which I can never be prcsenl in 
and parlicipaite in a film I'm viewing. Even though I do often seem lo be watching a 
dream r am in. seem both in the dream and not in it at the same time. I am 
nevertheless in the dream -in its space, interacting with other things in that space, 
in a way in which l can never be in the world of a film I'm viewing, interacting with 
olher things in that world. Sparshott says of films that "we have no sense of effort 
and participation in their world, as we do in that of our dreams.,; this seems to me 
right. 
But Sparshotl also says "the alienated space of film is not the only experienced 
space in which the .spectator participates without contact" and he speaks of "the 
dreamlike rtoalmg between participation and observation . . .  that gives film space 
its pervasive character". So there is, on his account, "no sense of effort and par· 
ticipation," "a floating between participation and observation," and a participation 
''without con1tact." What might-be called participation without contact seems to me 
to be mainly psychological involvement - empathy with the characters, vicarious 
participation in their actions - combined with that vaguest sense of presence as 
spectator al the filmed scene produced by the dominance of the .large screen and all 
those gradients, including motion gradients, in the screen image, which gi,·e an 
illusiun of depth and distance. Film space i� alienated from the viewer; but the 
dreamer does not know he is dreaming in the way that the film viewer knO\l/S he is 
watching a film. hence dream space is nol alienated in the same way. What is 
mi�ing in my experience of film space is the sense of participation as agent. In 
dreams I do have contact with other things in dream space; and though I suppose 
film space does have sometliing of a pervasive character, it is unlike dream space in 
tha1 I am aware of it as framed and do not move about in it. 
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That we do nol experience film lime as present time becomes apparent when we 
compare watching a film with watching live television. Our sense that what is 
happening on the screen is happening (somewhere else) now often enhances our 
'ie\\ ing of live television,3 but that feeling of present time is absent when we view a 
film; we do tend to take a film as a record of past events. We are, as Sparsbott says, 
11pectators of the film's temporality. But when dreaming I tend to experience dream 
time as present time, this largely because of my being an agent in the dream's 
world. In the world of the dream I am actually, not just vicariously, engaged in the 
action. and what I seem to be doing, I seem lo be doing al the time I seem to be 
doing it. 
The world of a film, like that of a dream, is usually constituted of a succession of 
discont inuous spaces and time stretches, and each of those spaces and time 
stretches has great elasticity, may be distorted in various ways. l think it is in this 
elasticity and discontinuity of space and time that there is the strongest analogy 
between films and dreams. The other analogy that Sparshott suggests - that in our 
experience of both there is a floating between observation and participation -
seems to me a much weaker one. largely because my sense of participation is so 
much greater in dreams than at films, and my sense of being a spectator so much 
greater at films than in dreams. The point of all this then is io suggest that although 
Sparshott effectively exploits the comparison with dreams to display the elasticity 
and discontinuity of film cime and space, by that same comparison he tends to 
exaggerate the extent to which someone watching a rilm feels himself present at the 
filmed event. Since, as Sparsbott notes, different people seem to have different 
dream perceptions - and, it seems to me likely, different film perceptions too- I 
am only claiming that his descriptions do not fit my own experiences. Nevertheless, 
any strong conclusion about the extent to which the film viewer participates in the 
film's space and time rests uneasily with what I take to be a main strandl of Spar­
shott's argument - i.e. his devastating critique of the theory that whe11 we are 
absorbed in watching a film it is as if we are at the scene of the filmed event, our 
'iewpoint that of the camera, witnessing what is presently going on. 
Sparshotl shows that this sort of account is the incorporation of two untenable 
dogmas. One, that film viewers identify with the camera's viewpoint, is falsified by 
the viewer's (often unnoticing) acceptance o,f shifts in viewpoint. The second, that 
viewers always take film time to be present time, is falsified by the viewer's easy 
acceptance of flash-backs and flash-forwards. Sparshott argues convincingly that 
becaus� of its photographic quality, film's authenticity is that of a faithful recording 
of events; in the absence of counter-indications we tend to believe the filmed 
events really occurred as we see them. That we take the film as record parUy ex­
plams our ready acceptance of quick shifts in viewpoint and leaps in time: we do 
not expect in a narrative record what we expect of experienced actuality -
chronological order of events and continuity of viewpoint toward them. What 
really explodes the myth of the viewer as camera is that for some shots there is no 
possible real viewpoint, and sometimes what's on the screen has no spatial or 
temporal location even in the film's world of reality; the status of what's on the 
screen is often not clear at the time we see it  and may be clarified only later. What 
makes tlhe world of the film intelligible, then, is primaril y  that there is. and we 
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understand there to be, a narrative structure governing the su ccession of events. 
ano we ilcciept spatial and temporal distortions. the objectification of characters' 
thoughts and feelings, and evocative images introduced by the director, as ex· 
pressive narrative devices. 
The line of Sparshott's argument that I sketched in the preceding paragraph is 
one with which I agree enthusiastically. What Sparshotl does not argue explicitly, 
but I would, is that when the film is not taken as a recording of events that really 
occurred, in is taken as a recording of events that were contrived; and that it is 
taken as a recording entails that 110 film time is taken as present time. One point 
that I think is implicit in Sparshott's account but lhat perhaps is worth emphasiizing 
is this: when we are caught up in viewing a film we are primarily .concerned with the 
story. As Durgnat writes: 
"It is in the spectator's sharing of, and concern for, the experience of these 
characters in these predicaments. It is a simple empathy-sympa thy - and no more 
uncritical than is our sympathy for friends and acquaintances in real life. 
"Thus the spectator's response is largely to human experience. Undoubtedly this 
experience is nuanced by, affected by, 'seen through' all the 'secondary charac· 
tcristics' of style - cutting, camera-angle and movements, and! so on, and so on. 
But, in the dramatic films which are now the mainstream of the cinema, it is the 
function of these characteristics to relate themselves to, to build up, to add to. this 
·resonance'. This resonance can be discussed only in moral-emotional terms."4 
Our fundamental concern ms not, of course, with the film's space and time, but with 
certain characters in certain human situations; often to the extent that we attend to 
spatial and temporal features of the film's world, to that extent we have lost that 
primary form of engagement. That our main concern is with human experience 
partly explains why the narrative structure dominates in a way to make intelligible 
the film's world. And it also partly explains our sense of presence at the fiJtmed 
scene - Jargely psychological involvement with the characters and their situation. 
NOTES 
1. Gl!Orge W. Linden, REFLECTIONS ON THE SCREEN C Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1970) p. 171. 
2. J .  Masserman, as quoted by William C. Dement, "An Essay on Dreams: the Role of Physiology in Un· 
derstancl1ng Their Nature" in NEW D I RECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGY II (New York: Holl, Rinehart & 
Winston, 1965) p. 140. 
3. There is in television something of an analogue to what Sparsholl argues for concerning film's authen. 
ticily: we often tend to assume that what we are viewing on TV is happening now, unless there are counter. 
indications. One needs to distinguish, though, I Ive TV reporting and non.drama tic entertainment, from I Ive 
TV drama: In the former the event is taking place now, in the latter the acting is taking place now, but not 
the scene enacted. Penelope Houston makes some interesting comments on still another sense of "that 
absolute conviction of here and now which is television's special advantage over the cinema." THE 
CONTEMPORARY C I N EMA (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1963) p. 17. Seealsop. 19lf. 
4, Raymond Durgnat, FILMS ANO FEELINC.S (Cambridge.Mass.: MIT Press, 1967) p, 173. 
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